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Note 
 
Dissent Without Disloyalty:  
Expanding the Free Speech Rights of Military 
Members Under the “General Articles” of the 
UCMJ 
Jason Steck* 
In 1987, a 19-year-old airman in Japan hosted a “bulletin 
board system” or “BBS,” where users could argue about sports, 
operating systems, and politics. To compete with other BBS 
systems, the young airman created a fictional character—
Illyovich, named after a twisting of Lenin’s middle name—to 
provide provocative fodder by spewing a vulgar Marxist line.1 
After an anonymous complaint, the airman was arrested and 
investigated for two months for the crime of making “disloyal 
statements” in violation of Article 134 of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ).2  
Nineteen years later, in an unrelated case, Army Lt. Ehren 
Watada was charged under Article 133 of the UCMJ3 for, 
among other things, “conduct unbecoming an officer.”4 The al-
 
*  J.D. and Ph.D. candidate, University of Minnesota. Special thanks to 
Professor Heidi Kitrosser, Professor Stephen Cribari, Professor Russell Ander-
son, and Brad Emmons for insightful suggestions. Thanks also to Professor 
Ronald Krebs, Professor Phil Shively, Professor Heidi Kitrosser, Geoff Pipoly, 
Stephanie Zuercher, Kelsey Kelley, Sandi Cruse, Lt. Col. Darin Williams, BJ 
Franqui, Warner Emdee, and the board and staff of Minnesota Law Review. 
The author would also like to extend special recognition to the Computer 
Crime Division of the United States Air Force Office of Special Investigations 
at Yokota Air Base, Japan, circa 1987. Without the aggressive eight-week in-
vestigation of a 19-year-old’s Commodore 128 computer by those OSI investi-
gators, this Note might never have been written. Copyright © 2012 by Jason 
Steck. 
 1. Personal experience of the author.  
 2. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 
(2006). The investigation was conducted by the local Office of Special Investi-
gations (OSI) and was eventually terminated without significant disciplinary 
action. 
 3. Id. art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933. 
 4. See Melanthia Mitchell, Fort Lewis Soldier Opposed to War Faces Mil-
 2012] FREE SPEECH OF MILITARY MEMBERS 1607 
 
leged conduct included participation in a peace rally where he 
expressed his belief that the war in Iraq was illegal.5 In both of 
these cases, a military member was targeted for speech that 
would be legally uncontroversial for a civilian. 
Compared to civilians, military personnel enjoy sharply 
curtailed First Amendment rights.6 Defenders of these re-
strictions highlight a tradition of judicial deference to military 
culture.7 Advocates of greater rights for service members re-
spond that such deference is over-applied at the cost of basic 
civil liberties.8 Had it not been ended by an unusual procedural 
error,9 and Lt. Watada’s subsequent resignation from the mili-
tary,10 Watada v. Head might have provided long-overdue ad-
 
itary Trial, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at B2, available at 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20061110&slug=w
atada10m. 
 5. Id.; see also Watada v. Head, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1138 (W.D. Wash. 
2007). 
 6. See, e.g., UCMJ art. 88, 10 U.S.C. § 888 (barring “contemptuous 
words” towards senior officials); UCMJ art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (proscribing 
“conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman”); UCMJ art. 134, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 934 (prohibiting “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline”).  
 7. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (“While the mem-
bers of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First 
Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the mil-
itary mission requires a different application of these protections.”); Captain 
John A. Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community: Striking a Balance Be-
tween Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 45 A.F. L. REV. 303, 368 (1998) 
(“[J ]udicial deference to the military . . . is necessary . . . for the continued 
maintenance of the military as an effective and efficient fighting force.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Emily Reuter, Note, Second Class Citizen Soldiers: A Pro-
posal for Greater First Amendment Protections for America’s Military Person-
nel, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 315, 336–37 (2007) (arguing for the applica-
tion of “strict scrutiny” to military regulation of its members’ free speech 
rights); Sarah N. Rosen, Comment, Be All That You Can Be? An Analysis of 
and Proposed Alternative to Military Speech Regulations, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 875, 877 (2010) (arguing for application of public employee doctrine to the 
military); Linda Sugin, Note, First Amendment Rights of Military Personnel: 
Denying Rights to Those Who Defend Them, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 855, 858 (1987) 
(advocating for loosened free speech restrictions for military members in 
peacetime but deference to the military’s stringent regulations in wartime). 
 9. Watada, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (terminating Lt. Watada’s second 
court-martial on double jeopardy grounds). The Obama Administration later 
decided to drop charges against Lt. Watada. See Hal Bernton, Justice Depart-
ment Drops Appeal in Watada Case, SEATTLE TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A1, 
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009184970_ 
webwatada.html. 
 10. See Army Officer Who Refused Iraq Duty Is Allowed to Resign, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2009, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/ 
27/us/27discharge.html. 
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justments to the boundaries of dissent within the military. But 
similar cases arise whenever national security issues are prom-
inent;11 the Watada case will surely not be the last.  
This Note argues that existing restrictions on military free 
speech rights are overbroad, obsolete, and should be replaced 
by an adjusted application of existing doctrines of employer 
regulation of employees’ speech. Part I summarizes existing 
regulation of speech by military members under the general ar-
ticles of the UCMJ—with particular focus on the treatment of 
disloyal statements—and the foundations of judicial deference 
to claims of military necessity. Part II critiques the assump-
tions that lie at the root of judicial deference to the military’s 
regulation of its members’ speech, exposing the myth of an en-
tirely separate military community as well as the pernicious ef-
fects of extra judicial punishments on expressions of dissent. 
Part II also highlights the recent decline in judicial deference 
that may provide an opening to reexamine free speech rights 
for military members. Part III proposes that military speech 
regulation be reformed to apply existing Pickering v. Board of 
Education standards for government regulation of its employ-
ees’ speech, with adjustments for particular military opera-
tions.12 This Note concludes by arguing that implementation of 
modified Pickering standards would provide better free speech 
protections for military members than discretionary implemen-
tation by military commanders while avoiding interference 
with military objectives that could accompany implementation 
of unmodified Pickering standards. 
I.  DIFFERING FREE SPEECH RIGHTS FOR CIVILIAN 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND MILITARY MEMBERS   
The government has a narrower ability to regulate civilian 
employees’ speech compared to its virtually unlimited ability to 
punish military members’ speech. When the government acts 
as a civilian employer, the courts have required it to respect 
employees’ rights to speak on matters of public concern unless 
doing so significantly harms the operation of the workplace. 
But when the government acts as military employer, the courts 
have broadly deferred to almost all government restrictions on 
speech. 
 
 11. Reuter, supra note 8, at 316 (noting the correlation between the occur-
rence of foreign wars and public interest in military dissent). 
 12. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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A. CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ENJOY SIGNIFICANT 
FREE SPEECH PROTECTIONS 
Courts have been somewhat protective of the free speech 
rights of civilian government employees. In 1968, the Supreme 
Court in Pickering considered the case of a school teacher who 
was fired after writing a letter to a newspaper that was critical 
of her superiors’ handling of school funding proposals.13 The 
Court rejected the notion that civilian employees owe an un-
qualified duty to refrain from public criticism.14 Instead, the 
Court established a balancing test for government regulation of 
its civilian employees’ speech, weighing the government’s inter-
est as an employer against employees’ free speech rights as cit-
izens.15 First, the Court noted that speech related to a “public 
concern” must receive First Amendment protections.16 In fact, 
when civilian employees speak out on a matter of public policy, 
the Court noted that they are often among the best-informed 
contributors to public debate on the subject.17 As such, the 
Court was reluctant to allow their speech to be suppressed by 
fears of termination.18 
However, this protection is not absolute. Rather, it applies 
only to speech regarding matters of public concern. In Connick 
v. Myers, the Court considered the case of an Assistant District 
Attorney dismissed for insubordination after distributing a 
questionnaire containing material critical of her superiors.19 
The Court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect 
employee speech relating to purely personal interests, such as 
personal criticism of superiors.20 When employee speech does 
not relate to a public concern, the Court instructs deference to 
the government’s interest in maintaining the authority struc-
 
 13. Id. at 564. 
 14. Id. at 568–69. 
 15. Id. at 568 (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between 
the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of 
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”). 
 16. Id. at 574 (“[S]tatements by public officials on matters of public con-
cern must be accorded First Amendment protection despite the fact that the 
statements are directed at their nominal superiors.” (citing Garrison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 (1964))). 
 17. Id. at 571–72. 
 18. Id. at 572. 
 19. 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983). 
 20. Id. at 147; see also id. at 149 (“[T]he First Amendment does not re-
quire a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over 
internal office affairs.”). 
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ture and efficient functioning of the office.21 Moreover, the 
Court has left open the question of whether statements that 
were “knowingly or recklessly false” might be the basis for ter-
mination even if they were regarding a matter of public  
concern.22 
In Connick, the Court also limited the reach of the gov-
ernment’s regulation of its civilian employees’ speech in terms 
of when and where the speech occurs. The Court noted that, 
when acting as an employer, the government can punish speech 
that occurs in the workplace, occurs during work time, or oth-
erwise interferes directly with the functioning of the office.23 
Specifically, the Court found that the purpose of the disgrun-
tled employee’s survey questions was “not to evaluate the per-
formance of the office but rather to gather ammunition” in sup-
port of her protest against an adverse personnel action.24 Thus, 
the effect of granting First Amendment protection in such a 
context would be to create a novel “grant of immunity for em-
ployee grievances not afforded by the First Amendment to 
those who do not work for the State.”25 The Court thus appar-
ently sought to balance the government’s interest in an effi-
ciently functioning workplace against the employees’ right to 
engage in public advocacy on matters of public concern.26 But 
the Court has limited the allowable scope of this regulation by 
prohibiting the government from punishing speech that relates 
to nonoffice matters, does not impact the workplace, or takes 
place outside the workplace.27 Thus, while the Connick Court 
 
 21. Id. at 153; see also id. at 154 (“[ I ]t would indeed be a Pyrrhic victory 
for the great principles of free expression if the [First] Amendment’s safe-
guarding of a public employee’s right . . . to participate in discussions concern-
ing public affairs were confused with the attempt to constitutionalize the em-
ployee grievance that we see presented here.”). 
 22. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 n.6 (“[W]e have no occasion to pass upon 
the additional question whether a statement that was knowingly or recklessly 
false would . . . still be protected by the First Amendment.”).  
 23. Connick, 461 U.S. at 153; see also id. at 153 n.13 (noting that speech 
“on the employee’s own time[ ] and in non-work areas of the office” might re-
ceive greater protection). 
 24. Id. at 148. 
 25. Id. at 147. 
 26. Id. at 150 (applying the Pickering balancing test). 
 27. Compare id. at 153 (noting that the distribution of a questionnaire 
took place in the workplace and caused the employee to “leave her work”), with 
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 454 (1995) (strik-
ing down government regulations banning compensation for non-workplace 
speaking appearances by government civilian employees), and Rankin v. 
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390–91 (1987) (holding that workplace comment ap-
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may have disavowed any desire to extend government employ-
ees’ speech rights beyond those of private sector workers, the 
restrictions placed on the scope of the government’s regulation 
of employee speech nonetheless give government employees 
some unique protections.28 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,29 the Court further narrowed the 
protection of employee speech in the workplace. Garcetti in-
volved a case where a district attorney disagreed with his su-
pervisor’s decision to proceed with a prosecution notwithstand-
ing what the district attorney believed to be significant 
government misconduct.30 After expressing his disagreement, 
the district attorney alleged “a series of retaliatory employment 
actions” and brought suit alleging infringement of, inter alia, 
his First Amendment rights.31 The Supreme Court ruled 
against the district attorney, holding that speech that takes 
place in the course of performing assigned duties is not protect-
ed by the First Amendment.32 Thus, civilian speech in a gov-
ernment workplace is protected, but only if it involves a matter 
of public concern, does not disrupt the functioning of the office, 
and is not made merely in the course of official duties. 
B. MILITARY MEMBERS FACE SIGNIFICANT CONSTRAINTS ON 
SPEECH 
By contrast, free speech rights in the military are much 
more constrained. This Section highlights the constraints on 
free speech applied to military members. The UCMJ, which 
binds all military members, prohibits not only “conduct unbe-
coming an officer,”33 but also “all disorders and neglects to the 
prejudice of good order and discipline” and “all conduct of a na-
ture to bring discredit upon the armed forces.”34 These provi-
 
plauding an attempt on the life of the President did not interfere with the 
functioning of the office and could therefore not be cause for termination), and 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572–73 (observing that writing a letter critical of gov-
ernment policy did not interfere with a teacher’s ability to perform his duties). 
 28. See generally BRUCE BARRY, SPEECHLESS: THE EROSION OF FREE EX-
PRESSION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 1–10 (2007) (arguing that freedom of 
speech in the workplace, particularly in the private sector, is excessively and 
needlessly limited). 
 29. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 30. Id. at 414–15. 
 31. Id. at 415. 
 32. Id. at 421. 
 33. UCMJ art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2006). 
 34. Id. art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934.  
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sions exist in Articles 133 and 134 of the UCMJ, and are com-
monly referred to as the “general articles.”35 Similar to the rela-
tionship between federal statutes and administrative rules, the 
general articles are implemented by detailed specifications of 
particular crimes in the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM).36 
Among the wide range of speech and conduct prohibited by the 
general articles37 is the making of “disloyal statements.”38  
Military members have, however, challenged the general 
articles as overbroad restraints on their free speech rights in 
violation of the First Amendment. For example, in the 1974 
case Parker v. Levy, the Supreme Court took up an appeal from 
an Army officer who, while serving as a trainer for medics des-
tined for service in the Vietnam War, encouraged black soldiers 
to refuse orders to serve.39 Upon conviction by court-martial for, 
inter alia, violations of the general articles, the officer chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the general articles as over-
broad, in violation of the First Amendment.40 The Court reject-
ed this challenge, holding that the general articles are not 
overbroad because the MCM narrows the wide textual reach of 
the general articles themselves.41 The Court also noted that 
these MCM limits implemented earlier court decisions requir-
ing that, in order to be punishable, speech must “directly and 
palpably”42 threaten military discipline by “call[ing] for active 
opposition to the military policy of the United States.”43 Mili-
tary courts have reviewed and reaffirmed the continuing rele-
vance of this holding as recently as 2008.44 Notwithstanding 
such gestures, however, the courts have generally applied a 
 
 35. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 passim (1974). 
 36. JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, U.S. MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL pt. IV, para. 59–113 (2008) [hereinafter MCM]. 
 37. The general articles are also implicated in other recent controversies, 
including the recent struggles to repeal the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
policy barring service by homosexuals unless they concealed their sexual ori-
entation. It is noteworthy, for example, that one of the most important works 
criticizing the policy drew its title from the language of Article 133. See RANDY 
SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: GAYS & LESBIANS IN THE U.S. MILITARY 
(1994).  
 38. MCM, supra note 36, pt. IV, para. 72.  
 39. Parker, 417 U.S. at 736–37 (1974); see also id. at 738–39 nn. 5–6. 
 40. Id. at 752. 
 41. Id. (citing what is now MCM, supra note 36, pt. IV, para. 72). 
 42. Id. at 753 (quoting United States v. Sadinsky, 34 C.M.R. 343, 345 
(C.M.A. 1964)). 
 43. Id. (citing United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338 (C.M.A. 1972)). 
 44. United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 447 (C.A.A.F. 2008). 
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much more deferential standard of review towards military 
cases involving free speech claims compared to similar civilian 
claims. 
C. THE COURT HAS CITED A SEPARATE MILITARY CULTURE AS 
JUSTIFYING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH 
Having noted the pattern of judicial deference towards mil-
itary regulations impinging on members’ free speech rights, 
this Section highlights the foundations of this deference. Specif-
ically, this Section outlines the courts’ adherence to a set of be-
liefs about the military as separate, apart, and even incompati-
ble with the civilian world. 
In cases upholding the general articles and applying them 
to free speech issues, the military courts have sometimes used 
the rhetoric of a balancing test, but without actually applying 
the balancing method outlined in the Court’s civilian prece-
dents in Pickering and Connick.45 Rather, when assessing the 
reach of military members’ free speech rights against military 
claims of necessity, courts “balance” using a scale heavily 
weighted in favor of the government, interpreting the MCM 
limitations on the general articles very loosely. For example, 
while the Court in Parker specifically rejected the common no-
tion that military members entirely forfeit their free speech 
rights upon joining the military, it endorsed a fundamentally 
different basis for interpreting and applying those rights: the 
“different character of the military community.”46 Moreover, the 
Court drew the boundary of permissible government interests 
much more broadly in the military context, allowing the mili-
tary to punish not only speech that interferes with office func-
 
 45. See, e.g., Priest, 45 C.M.R. at 344 (“[T]he proper balance must be 
struck between the essential needs of the armed services and the right to 
speak out as a free American.”).  
 46. Parker, 417 U.S. at 758; see also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 
(1980) (“[T]he military services ‘must insist upon a respect for duty and a dis-
cipline without counterpart in civilian life.’” (quoting Schlesinger v. Council-
man, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975))); Parker, 417 U.S. at 743 (“[T]he military is, by 
necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society.”); Orloff v. 
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (“The military constitutes a specialized 
community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian.”); Wil-
cox, 66 M.J. at 448 n.3 (“[A]dditional burdens may be placed on First Amend-
ment rights in the context of the military, given the different character of the 
military community and mission.”); cf. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 
(1976) (“[T]he business of a military installation like Fort Dix [is] to train sol-
diers, not to provide a public forum.”).  
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tioning, but also any speech that might generally “undermine 
the effectiveness of response to command.”47  
This approach coheres with a pattern of civilian deference 
to military courts in the interpretation and administration of 
military justice.48 The Court has analogized military law to 
state law, highlighting the absence of any role for federal civil-
ian courts in interpreting it.49 The Court has also emphasized 
the unique powers of Congress regarding military matters.50 
Because Congress has exercised these powers to establish a 
“carefully designed military justice system,” the Court has been 
strongly inclined to forego meaningful civilian review whenever 
possible.51 Perhaps most importantly, the Court has proclaimed 
that the judiciary has a general lack of competence regarding 
military affairs.52 Indeed, the Court has tacitly embraced the 
views of Professor Samuel P. Huntington, who prescribed rigid 
cultural separation and mutual assumptions of professional in-
 
 47. Parker, 417 U.S. at 759 (citing United States v. Gray, 42 C.M.R. 255 
(1970)). But see Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 448 (requiring that the prosecution also 
show a “direct and palpable connection between [a member’s] speech and the 
military mission or military environment,” but failing to provide any definition 
as to what would or would not constitute such a connection).  
 48. See generally Stephanie A. Levin, The Deference That Is Due: Rethink-
ing the Jurisprudence of Judicial Deference to the Military, 35 VILL. L. REV. 
1009 (1990) (arguing for a reconsideration of the proper balance between civil 
liberties and military institutions). 
 49. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). 
 50. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981) (citing Schlesinger v. 
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975) as well as Congress’s own invocation of U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8). 
 51. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 753 (1975) (“[Cases] must be 
assessed in light of the deference that should be accorded the judgments of the 
carefully designed military justice system established by Congress.”); see also 
Parker, 417 U.S. at 744–49 (tracing the history of deference by civilian courts 
to the military justice system); Burns, 346 U.S. at 139–42 (staking out a care-
fully limited role for civilian courts when reviewing the actions of military 
courts); Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
181, 186–87 (1962) (tracing the tradition of deference to military courts as far 
back as 1863 in an article authored by the then-sitting Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court).  
 52. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (“[I ]t is difficult to conceive 
of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence. 
The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, 
equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military 
judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive 
Branches.”); see also Rostker, 453 U.S. at 66 (noting a “healthy deference to 
legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs”); Orloff v. 
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953) (“[J ]udges are not given the task of run-
ning the Army.”).  
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capacity between civilian and military worlds.53 Huntington’s 
separatist civil-military prescription has, in fact, advanced to 
the level of consensus throughout American political culture.54 
Provoked in part by the Vietnam War experience, however, 
some began to question whether the assumption of cultural 
separation and the resulting judicial deference remained ap-
propriate, if indeed it ever was.55 For example, some legal 
scholars questioned the underlying presumption of a unique 
and separate military culture requiring judicial deference and 
abstention.56 Others specifically highlighted free speech contro-
versies from the Vietnam era, arguing that the inadequacies of 
the military justice system in dealing with such issues de-
manded greater intervention by civilian courts.57  
Scholars have broadened and deepened these critiques 
since the end of the Cold War. Some have posited the emer-
gence of a “postmodern military” that in its essential elements 
is akin to any civilian profession.58 Scholars specializing in civil-
 
 53. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 83–85 (1957) 
(arguing that, at the height of the Cold War, robust cultural and professional 
separation between military and civilian spheres was vital to maintaining mil-
itary effectiveness). 
 54. ELIOT A. COHEN, SUPREME COMMAND 226 (2002) (“[Huntington’s 
view] has come . . . to be commonly viewed as the ‘normal’ theory of civil-
military relations—the accepted theoretical standard against which the cur-
rent reality is to be judged.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Donald N. Zillman & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Constitutional 
Rights and Military Necessity: Reflections on the Society Apart, 51 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 396, 400 (1976) (detailing the growing together of civilian and mil-
itary society). 
 56. See, e.g., James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military 
Uniqueness and Servicemen’s Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177, 205 
(1984) (“[T]he typical or common member of the armed forces is not an alien 
outcast but is one of us.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried & Donald N. Zillman, An Evolution 
in the First Amendment: Overbreadth Analysis and Free Speech Within the 
Military Community, 54 TEX. L. REV. 42, 42 (1975) (reviewing Vietnam-era 
developments in the application of military restrictions on military members’ 
First Amendment rights); Edward F. Sherman, The Military Courts and Ser-
vicemen’s First Amendment Rights, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 373 (1971) (“It is 
now vitally important that consideration be given to civilian law prece-
dents . . . in these military speech cases.”); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 43, 156 (1974) (same); Detlev F. Vagts, Free Speech in the 
Armed Forces, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 187 (1957) (reviewing earlier policy debates 
regarding free speech in the military). 
 58. Charles C. Moskos et al., Armed Forces After the Cold War, in THE 
POSTMODERN MILITARY 1, 2 (Charles C. Moskos et al. eds., 2000). 
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military relations have noted the increasing integration of the 
military into civilian political debates as well.59  
Civilian courts have also begun to cast a more engaged and 
critical eye on military policies. In recent years, for example, 
the Court refused to defer to claims of military exigencies in the 
treatment of prisoners.60 Lower courts have also begun to more 
aggressively review the claims of military members challenging 
infringements on civil liberties arising from military policies.61 
In fact, civilian courts generally appear to be increasingly will-
ing to review military policies and the holdings of military 
courts.62 
Still, constraints on the free speech rights of military 
members remain considerable, and legal scholars have pro-
posed a range of responses. At one extreme, some argue that 
courts should continue to defer to military judgments, leaving 
any accommodations to the discretion of military command-
ers.63 On the other extreme, some argue for unconditional ap-
plication of Pickering balancing to military members.64 Between 
these polar approaches, some have criticized specific military 
 
 59. See generally MICHAEL C. DESCH, CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILI-
TARY: THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT (1999) (emphasizing the notion 
that civilian authorities inevitably pay close attention to military matters, es-
pecially in wartime); PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVER-
SIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (2003) (arguing that the civilian execu-
tive monitors the actions of military agents). 
 60. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 727 (2008) (requiring the 
government to provide evidence of actual impact on the mission before the 
Court would defer to the withholding of civilian habeus corpus review for pris-
oners); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529–33 (2004) (applying a balancing 
test between a detainee’s interests and the government’s interests rather than 
deferring to the military outright); see also id. at 535 (“While we accord the 
greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military authorities in 
matters relating to the actual prosecution of a war . . . it does not infringe on 
the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-
honored and constitutionally mandated roles.” (emphasis added)). 
 61. See, e.g., Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 
1310 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (striking down the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
policy on equal-protection grounds notwithstanding continuing military claims 
to require prohibitions against open homosexuality in the military as neces-
sary to “high morale, good order, discipline, and unit cohesion”). 
 62. Id.; see also Watada v. Head, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1147 (W.D. Wash. 
2007) (asserting a willingness to intervene in ongoing court-martial proceed-
ings once the petitioner’s options within the military justice system are  
exhausted). 
 63. See, e.g., Carr, supra note 7, at 307–11.  
 64. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 8, at 898–903. 
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regulations65 and proposed reforms that would improve free 
speech protections only during peacetime.66 Thus far, however, 
none have articulated specific proposals to adapt Pickering bal-
ancing to the unique requirements of the military context. 
II.  ANALYZING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF REDUCED 
MILITARY FREE SPEECH RIGHTS   
This Part critiques the bases for civilian judicial deference 
towards restrictions on military members’ free speech rights. 
Specifically, this Part argues that the assumption of a “sepa-
rate culture” in the military was probably never true, and is 
certainly untrue in the post-Vietnam and post-Cold War eras. 
Moreover, because courts have misunderstood the role of dis-
sent in the military, they have simultaneously overestimated 
its impact on military effectiveness and underestimated the 
impact of restrictions on military members’ speech. However, 
courts’ traditional deference with regard to military affairs has 
been fading in recent years. This new judicial engagement 
opens a window of opportunity for reform in military members’ 
free speech rights, allowing courts to use the growing conver-
gence between the concerns that motivate regulation of both 
military and civilian employees’ speech. 
A. THE MYTH OF CULTURAL SEPARATION BETWEEN CIVILIAN 
AND MILITARY WORLDS 
This Section critiques the main judicial justification for de-
ferring to claims of military necessity in the restrictions on 
members’ free speech rights. Specifically, this Section argues 
that the image of a wall of separation dividing civilian and mil-
itary cultures has always been more idealized myth than reali-
ty. From its beginning, the United States military and its civil-
ian society have been unusually “permeable” compared to 
European countries.67 In particular, the extensive use of militia 
to supplement military forces in the nation’s early history 
 
 65. Katherine C. Den Bleyker, Note, The First Amendment Versus Opera-
tional Security: Where Should the Milblogging Balance Lie?, 17 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 401, 404–05 (2007) (critiquing restrictions 
on military bloggers and calling for strict scrutiny, but only in that specific 
context). 
 66. Sugin, supra note 8, at 876–90. 
 67. Ira Katznelson, Flexible Capacity: The Military and Early American 
Statebuilding, in SHAPED BY WAR AND TRADE 82, 101 (Ira Katznelson & Mar-
tin Shefter eds., 2002). 
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blurred the line between the civilian and military use of force.68 
And American political debates frequently feature debates over 
universal military training, seeking to conjoin military virtues 
with citizenship.69 These debates are often intertwined with de-
bates over conscription.70 Indeed, many advocates of the draft 
saw conscription as an important tool for maintaining the his-
tory of civil-military integration in the United States.71  
As discussed above, the courts have generally embraced 
Professor Huntington’s view of a military society set apart in 
the name of military effectiveness and professionalism.72 Specif-
ically, the Supreme Court has noted that “within the military 
community there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy 
as there is in the larger civilian community.”73 The Court has 
seen these restrictions as necessary to accomplish the military’s 
mission.74 These restrictions and their reasons are, according to 
the Court, “without counterpart in civilian life.”75 Moreover, the 
Court has disavowed even the role of the courts to weigh the 
necessity of military restrictions, deferring to “the professional 
judgment of military authorities concerning the relative im-
portance of a particular military interest.”76 Thus, the Court 
has sanctioned even restrictions that involve fundamental First 
Amendment claims when the military’s only interest is “uni-
form dress requirements.”77 The Court upheld these restrictions 
 
 68. Id. But see ELIOT A. COHEN, CITIZENS AND SOLDIERS 127 (1985) (not-
ing the skepticism of professional military officers towards militia forces 
throughout American history). 
 69. See COHEN, supra note 68, at 129–33 (reviewing those debates). 
 70. See, e.g., GEORGE Q. FLYNN, THE DRAFT, 1940–1973, at 88–109 (1993) 
(recounting President Truman’s efforts to end the draft and enact universal 
military training at the same time). 
 71. See, e.g., Morris Janowitz, The All-Volunteer Military as a “Sociopolit-
ical” Problem, 22 SOC. PROBS. 432, 448 (1975); see also BERNARD ROSTKER, I 
WANT YOU! THE EVOLUTION OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 374–75 (2006) 
(recounting the testimony of Professor Charles Moskos to Congress seeking to 
either return to conscription or enact universal military training). 
 72. See supra notes 45–54and accompanying text. 
 73. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974). 
 74. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506–07 (1986) (quoting Parker, 
417 U.S. at 743). 
 75. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975). 
 76. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507. 
 77. Id. at 509 (“The desirability of dress regulations in the military is de-
cided by the appropriate military officials, and they are under no constitution-
al mandate to abandon their considered professional judgment.”); see also id. 
at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court . . . evades its responsibility by 
eliminating, in all but name only, judicial review of military regulations that 
interfere with the fundamental constitutional rights of military personnel.”). 
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even though there was “almost no danger of impairment of 
the . . . military mission”78 and in spite of suspicion that “the 
Government has exaggerated the importance of [its] interest.”79 
In short, because of its belief in the absolute incompetence of 
civilian institutions to evaluate the decisions of military profes-
sionals, the Court has adopted, as Justice Brennan put it in 
dissent, “a subrational-basis standard—absolute, uncritical 
‘deference to the professional judgment of military authori-
ties’ . . . no matter how absurd or unsupported it may be.”80 
As noted earlier, this view of absolute civil-military separa-
tion has always been highly questionable.81 Since the end of the 
Vietnam War, the all-volunteer force has transformed the U.S. 
military in ways that depart even more dramatically from the 
separate worlds presumed by the courts. Today’s military con-
tains no draftees82 and no realistic prospect exists of ever re-
turning to conscription.83 Military jobs often require extensive 
technical expertise and specialized training unsuitable for con-
scripts.84 Demographically, the average military member of an 
all-volunteer military remains in the military for a much longer 
period than soldiers in the draft-era military.85 Even many 
overseas deployments now include family members, resulting 
in overseas military bases that sometimes resemble large 
American civilian communities.86 Additionally, the uniformed 
ranks themselves are supplemented both in the United States 
and overseas by large numbers of civilian government workers 
 
 78. Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 79. Id. at 512. 
 80. Id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 507 (majority  
opinion)). 
 81. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
 82. The Pentagon announced the end of the draft on January 27, 1973. 
ROSTKER, supra note 71, at 265. 
 83. See id. at 756 (noting a nearly unanimous vote in the House of Repre-
sentatives to reject a return to conscription even at the height of manpower 
pressures caused by the Iraq War); Janowitz, supra note 71, at 436 (explaining 
how a widespread “persistent reluctance to serve in the military” in advanced 
industrial societies leads inevitably towards all-volunteer militaries).  
 84. Janowitz, supra note 71, at 437 (“The all-volunteer system has also 
been designed to articulate with contemporary military technology which re-
quires longer periods of training.”); see also id. at 438–39. 
 85. Id. at 437–38. 
 86. Cf. GENERAL H. NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF & PETER PETRE, IT DOESN’T 
TAKE A HERO 261–63 (1992) (recounting the author’s difficulties upon finding 
that his military command responsibilities in Germany included responsibility 
for a large number of American civilians). 
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and contractors.87 In short, the military is not in fact segregated 
into a separate and distinct cultural environment. It is exposed 
to civilians and shares many features with a civilian career. 
Research into the evolution of the all-volunteer military 
has often emphasized the degree to which the military life has 
become transformed into just another career choice. Indeed, 
Professor Charles Moskos speaks of a “postmodern military” 
where men and women in uniform perform daily duties that 
are often exactly the same as civilian counterparts.88 When they 
return home from work and take off their uniforms, most mili-
tary members are indistinguishable from their civilian neigh-
bors.89 In fact, the all-volunteer military puts great emphasis on 
comparisons between functional specialties in the military and 
corresponding civilian occupations.90 And military leaders often 
value the all-volunteer force in part for the availability of civil-
ian tools of workplace rule enforcement; for example, soldiers in 
a conscripted military often eagerly sought to get kicked out of 
the service,91 while in an all-volunteer military termination is a 
punishment and a deterrent.92  
 
 87. See Charles C. Moskos, Toward a Postmodern Military: The United 
States as Paradigm, in THE POSTMODERN MILITARY, supra note 58, at 14, 21 
(noting the deployment of 10,000 civilian workers to Saudi Arabia during the 
Gulf War). See generally P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS 19 (2003) (not-
ing the increasing use of contractors to fulfill military functions, even includ-
ing combat). 
 88. Moskos et al., supra note 58 (“The Postmodern military is character-
ized by . . . increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, both 
structurally and culturally.”); see also Hirschhorn, supra note 56, at 205–06 
(noting that most military jobs have exact civilian counterparts and that even 
combat soldiers may not experience a unique relationship with government 
authority). 
 89. Cf. Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 55 (“The ‘society apart’ was a 
valid description of the small, 19th century, regular Army fighting Indians on 
the frontier. . . . But by 1974, the military had become a multimillion-person 
employer involved in almost every aspect of American life. . . . [T]he modern 
military shows increasing signs of ‘creeping civilianism.’”). 
 90. Cf. BETH J. ASCH & JAMES R. HOSEK, MILITARY COMPENSATION: 
TRENDS AND POLICY OPTIONS 4–12 (1999) (evaluating the “pay gap” between 
military functional specialties and their civilian counterparts). 
 91. See Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 55, at 402 (“The very necessi-
ty of conscription in America’s last four wars argues that [the civilian sanction 
of firing unsatisfactory performers] would be inadequate.”); see also M*A*S*H 
(CBS television broadcast 1972–83) (character of Corporal Klinger). 
 92. See Status of the All-Volunteer Armed Force: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Manpower and Pers. of the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 95th 
Cong. 60–61, 68 (1978) (testimony of General Smith, Army Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Personnel). Compare OTTO F. WAHL, MEDIA MADNESS: PUBLIC IMAG-
ES OF MENTAL ILLNESS 6 (1995) (recounting the struggles of fictional draftee 
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A few scholars have suggested that the existence of an ide-
ological gap between civilian and military communities necessi-
tates separation. According to this theme, military culture re-
flects a uniquely conservative worldview that must be isolated 
from contemporary political debate unless civilian society is al-
so politically conservative.93 Some have even suggested, rather 
fanatically, that political dissent arising within the American 
military risks a coup.94 But although research shows that mili-
tary members tend to be somewhat more politically conserva-
tive and religious than civilians, these are statistical deviations 
of degree rather than cultural type.95 Ample groups of civilians 
exist that are just as politically conservative and religious as 
the military, if not more so.96 Moreover, studies have found that 
college professors deviate politically from the rest of society far 
more than the military does,97 yet no one suggests that academ-
ia be deemed a separate culture subject to reduced constitu-
 
Corporal Klinger seeking to obtain a discharge by feigning transvestite and 
bizarre behaviors), with NATHANIEL FRANK, UNFRIENDLY FIRE 1–25 (2009) 
(recounting the struggles of gay service members to remain in the military 
under the 1993 “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy).  
 93. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 53, at 79 (casting the “military ethic” as 
inherently conservative); id. at 90–91, 153–55 (arguing that civilian “liberal-
ism” is hostile and contemptuous towards the military); id. at 83–85, 96–97 
(arguing that the way to accommodate the conservative military mind with 
liberal civilian politics is separation); id. at 463–64 (arguing that if high inter-
national threat makes separation impossible, then civilian society must be-
come more conservative to avoid undermining military effectiveness). 
 94. Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 55, at 405–06 (“Any expression of 
disagreement by servicemen might move the military into politics, or prompt a 
military coup.”); see also Charles C. Dunlap, Jr., The Origins of the American 
Military Coup of 2012, PARAMETERS, Winter 1992–93, at 2, available at http:// 
media.portland.indymedia.org/media/2004/05/288433.pdf (hypothetically de-
scribing how a military drawn into politics could result in a coup).  
 95. See Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn, Conclusion: The Gap and 
What It Means for American National Security, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS 
459, 459–61 (Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001). 
 96. Cf. Robert S. Erikson et al., State Political Culture and Public Opin-
ion, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797, 803 (1987) (finding that living in North Dakota 
was a greater predictor of political ideology than, among other things, religion). 
 97. Compare Stanley Rothman et al., Politics and Professional Advance-
ment Among College Faculty, 3 THE FORUM, no. 1, art. 2, 2005, at 5 (“[C]ollege 
faculty are about four times as liberal as the general public.”), with Ole R. 
Holsti, Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and 
Military Elites at the Start of the New Millennium, in SOLDIERS AND CIVIL-
IANS, supra note 95, at 15, 27–29 (finding Republican party identification 
within the military approximately twice that in the nonveteran civilian  
population). 
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tional rights.98 Given the reality of the “postmodern military,” 
whatever validity the Huntingtonian thesis of separate cultures 
had for justifying a general legal separation between military 
and civilian free speech rights now seems questionable.99 The 
combination of theoretical and empirical flaws in the hypothe-
sis of civil-military separatism produces a weak foundation for 
judicial deference to military restrictions on members’ free 
speech. 
B. COURTS MISUNDERSTAND THE EFFECTS OF DISSENT IN THE 
MILITARY 
In addition to the idea of cultural separation, courts have 
justified deference to military restrictions on speech by pointing 
to the threat of disorder in the ranks if speech were uncon-
strained. This Section examines those fears, concluding that 
they are overblown. 
Courts frequently rely upon two common assumptions 
about the threat of dissent in the military ranks. First, courts 
frequently assume that even mere exposure to dissent may 
cause disorder in the form of actual disobedience among the 
troops.100 Second, courts often assume that the restrictions that 
are imposed do not amount to a forfeiture of military members’ 
First Amendment rights.101 But neither of these assumptions re-
garding the role of dissent in the military holds true in practice. 
1. Cases of Dissent by Military Members Have Not Resulted 
in Disorder 
Case law upholding restrictions on “disloyal statements” is 
remarkable for the prevalence of speculative harms that are be-
lieved to flow from that dissent. Military and other courts have 
 
 98. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329–30 (2003) (acknowledging 
heightened First Amendment protections for education professionals). 
 99. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 368 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (condemning the use of “a series of platitudes about the special nature 
and overwhelming importance of military necessity”). But see Hirschhorn, su-
pra note 56, at 207–08 (arguing that Justice Brennan and others oversell their 
critique of the separate community theory). 
 100. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (“Speech that is pro-
tected in the civilian population may nonetheless undermine the effectiveness 
of response to command.” (quoting United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344 
(C.M.A. 1972))). 
 101. See, e.g., id. at 758 (“While the members of the military are not ex-
cluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different 
character of the military community and of the military mission requires a dif-
ferent application of those protections.”). 
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cast about in vain for cases featuring actual effects on morale 
or unit operation. For example, even in the seminal Parker 
case, where an Army officer openly encouraged enlisted men to 
disobey orders to deploy to Vietnam,102 the Supreme Court cited 
no evidence that anyone had actually heeded the officer’s call. 
In fact, the Parker dissent characterized the effect as harmless 
commentary.103 Finding no actual mission impact, military 
courts have tacitly retreated from the requirement that the 
threat to discipline be “direct and palpable,”104 emphasizing in-
stead that disloyal statements need not be effective to be legal-
ly prohibited.105 Indeed, courts have ruled that the damage to 
morale may be merely intended, unless the likelihood of success 
would be so remote “as to foreclose all possibility of successful 
promotion of disloyalty.”106 Some courts have even been willing 
to uphold punishment for speech that was not intended to pro-
mote disloyalty but might speculatively produce such an ef-
fect.107 But this dearth of actual evidence that dissent causes 
military disorder raises the inference that many of the prohibi-
tions against dissent by military members may be the result of 
unfounded fears.108 In any case, the net effect is to strip the lim-
itations that the Parker Court cited on the scope of the general 
articles of much of their bite.109 
 
 102. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 103. Parker, 417 U.S. at 771–72 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 104. See id. at 752–53 (majority opinion) (citing the “direct[ ] and palpabl[e]” 
requirement as a key limitation on the scope of the general articles). 
 105. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 42 C.M.R. 255, 259 (C.M.A. 1970) 
(“Successful propagation of disloyalty is not an essential element of the of-
fense.”). 
 106. Id. at 68 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 
338, 343 (C.M.A. 1972) (finding that distribution of pamphlets calling for sabo-
tage against the Vietnam War is sufficient to show prejudice to discipline even 
in the absence of any evidence of any military members heeding the call). 
 107. See Sec. of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676, 680 (1974) (per curium) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that undistributed pamphlets for which the 
Court had affirmed a conviction merely asked questions that “might at best 
have resulted in letters to [ ] family or Congressman or Senators” rather than 
any effect on other members’ accomplishment of their duties). 
 108. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 771 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
failure of a military court in a previous case to weigh the plausibility of its 
speculation that a reservist second lieutenant could become a threat to civilian 
control of the military by making statements critical of the Vietnam War).  
 109. See id. at 778 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (dismissing the “direct and pal-
pable” limitation as without any “substantive content” sufficient to limit Arti-
cles 133 and 134). 
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2. The Impact of Suppression of Speech Exceeds the Reach of 
Formal Restrictions 
While courts have exaggerated the impact of dissent on 
military effectiveness, they have underestimated the impact of 
legal restrictions on free speech in the all-volunteer military. 
Because the available punishments for any offense include the 
possibility of discharge or career-ending stigma,110 many mili-
tary members are likely to steer clear of anything that even 
might result in investigation. Members may fear the investiga-
tion itself as much as its outcome because of nonjudicial pun-
ishments that exist within the military.111 Specifically, military 
members faced with a court-martial are often offered a choice 
between nonjudicial punishment by their commander or a 
court-martial, either of which could end their career.112 Moreo-
ver, a military member who is merely under investigation may 
lose his security clearance temporarily and be assigned to close-
ly supervised menial duties wherein merely showing up late to 
work can be deemed “failure to go” in violation of the UCMJ.113 
Thus, because military members cannot be certain exactly 
where the line between allowable dissent and “disloyal state-
ments” may lie114 and because even coming within earshot of 
that line could endanger their career, the scope of speech that 
is suppressed in practice is probably far broader than even the 
broad scope of the restrictions actually applied. In a civilian 
context, the courts might be expected to closely scrutinize such 
a system as potentially having a “chilling effect” on otherwise 
protected First Amendment expression.115 But courts’ tradition 
 
 110. See LAWRENCE J. MORRIS, MILITARY JUSTICE 165–170 (2010) (outlin-
ing various nonjudicial means for separating military members from the ser-
vice even without a court martial). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. at 148–73 (outlining the nonjudicial punishment process and 
its potential consequences). 
 113. See id. at 65–66 (explaining how failure to show up for work on time is 
a crime under military law). 
 114. Compare United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 451 (C.A.A.F. 2008) 
(holding that statements directed towards an entirely civilian audience lacked 
“direct and palpable effect” on discipline), with Watada v. Head, 530 F. Supp. 
2d 1136, 1138 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (analyzing case of Army Lieutenant charged 
with violating Article 133 for having made “public statements” critical of the 
Iraq War), and Mitchell, supra note 4 (making clear that the “public state-
ments” referenced in Watada were media interviews). 
 115. Cf., e.g., Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 
556–57 (1963) (noting the Court’s concern with statutes that are vague or 
broad enough to deter speakers from engaging in protected expression out of 
fear that they might cross an uncertain line). 
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of deference has thus far prevented application of this doctrine 
to the military context.116 
C. CIVILIAN COURT DEFERENCE REGARDING MILITARY 
MATTERS IS DECLINING 
While the courts have traditionally been very deferential 
with regard to military matters, cracks are beginning to 
emerge. In recent cases dealing with detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay, for example, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the 
government’s contention that the courts had no competence in 
national security matters.117 In doing so, the Court approvingly 
cited a dissent from perhaps the most sweeping case of the 
Court’s deference to a claim of military exigency—Korematsu v. 
United States, where the Court notoriously deferred to military 
claims of necessity and upheld the exclusion of Japanese Amer-
icans from the West Coast during World War II.118  
Lower courts in recent years have also begun to press the 
boundaries of the Court’s military deference. For example, in 
Watada v. Head, a federal district court stepped in to block a 
court-martial retrial in the case of a service member claiming 
double jeopardy.119 While the district court claimed adherence 
to the Supreme Court’s deferential mandates regarding mili-
tary courts, it appeared to interpret the parameters of that def-
erence much more narrowly than the Supreme Court had.120 
 
 116. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 754 (1974) (refusing to apply 
void-for-vagueness doctrine to a free speech infringement claim in the military 
context). 
 117. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527, 534–35 (2004) (noting 
the traditional deference to the executive branch in time of war, but then ap-
plying an interest balancing test); see also id. at 535 (“What are the allowable 
limits of military discretion . . . are judicial questions.” (quoting Sterling v. 
Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932))). 
 118. See id. at 535 (“[L]ike other claims conflicting with the asserted con-
stitutional rights of the individual, the military claim must subject itself to the 
judicial process of having its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with 
other interests reconciled.” (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233–34 
(1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting))). 
 119. Watada, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1161. 
 120. Compare id. at 1148–49 (finding civilian courts competent to intervene 
at the point that military courts have concluded their consideration of the dis-
crete issue of defendant’s double jeopardy claims but prior to the conclusion of 
all of the defendant’s military court proceedings), with Schlesinger v. Coun-
cilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975) (refusing to allow civilian courts to issue in-
junctions until the “resolution of his case” in the military courts (emphasis 
added)). The difference is subtle, but important in that it may indicate a 
change from deference to the military courts pending the conclusion of a case 
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And in Witt v. U.S. Department of the Air Force, the district 
court considered a challenge to the military’s “don’t ask, don’t 
tell” policy.121 Other courts had upheld the policy, citing the 
tradition of judicial deference in military affairs.122 But the Witt 
court rejected Congress’s findings of a “fundamentally differ-
ent” military context, striking down the policy as unconstitu-
tional using the same standards used for civilian claims of dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation.123 
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), which 
provides the primary civilian review of military courts-
martial,124 has also begun to cast a more skeptical eye towards 
the general articles of the UCMJ. Specifically, in United States 
v. Fosler, the court held that prosecutors charging offenses un-
der Article 134 must specify which clause of the Article was be-
ing charged.125 While this represents only a relatively minor 
procedural change in practice, the reasoning in Fosler is im-
portant. The court held that more specific charging was re-
quired specifically in order to give military members greater 
clarity about what conduct was being charged under the broad-
ly sweeping general articles.126 It is reasonable to believe that 
the court could be sympathetic to a similar argument that mili-
tary members need greater clarity about what kinds of speech 
are proscribed under Article 134 as well. 
While, even collectively, these decisions continue to fall 
well short of challenging the linchpins of civilian courts’ defer-
ence in military matters,127 they nonetheless represent indica-
tions that the courts may be becoming less deferential towards 
 
to a willingness to intervene repeatedly as particular issues become ripe for 
review within a case. 
 121. 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1309–10 (W.D. Wash. 2010). The Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell (DADT) policy has since been repealed by President Barack H. 
Obama, thus mooting legal challenges. CNN Wire Staff, Obama Signs Repeal 
of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy, CNN.COM (Dec. 22, 2010), http://articles.cnn 
.com/2010-12-22/politics/dadt.repeal_1_repeal-openly-gay-men-president-barack 
-obama. But it is sufficient to note the decline in judicial deference to claims of 
military necessity for special restrictions on service members’ rights. 
 122. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 57–60 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 123. Witt, 739 F. Supp. 2d at 1311, 1315–17. 
 124. See Appellate Review of Courts-Martial, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE ARMED FORCES (Oct. 31, 2006), http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/ 
appell_review.htm (outlining the jurisdiction of the CAAF). 
 125. United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225, 232–33 (C.A.A.F. 2011). 
 126. Id. at 229–31. 
 127. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (barring 
military members from resorting to the courts to redress personal injuries suf-
fered in the course of military service). 
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the military over time, particularly when basic civil liberties 
claims are implicated and particularly with regard to the kinds 
of matters addressed by the general articles. 
D. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY CONCERNS ABOUT EMPLOYEE 
SPEECH ARE SIMILAR 
The factors discussed above—the decreasing separation of 
military and civilian culture combined with the lack of harm 
from dissent within the military ranks and the increasing will-
ingness of the courts to cast a skeptical eye on military poli-
cies—provide only an opportunity for reform in military mem-
bers’ free speech rights. By themselves, these factors do not 
indicate what form such reforms should take. This Section as-
sesses the similarity between concerns about workplace speech 
in the civilian and military context. This similarity justifies us-
ing standards adapted from the civilian workplace in the mili-
tary workplace. 
It is noteworthy that concerns over potential disruption 
from workplace speech are similar in civilian and military 
workplaces.128 For example, in Connick, the Supreme Court up-
held disciplinary action in part because any employee’s ques-
tionnaire that was critical of her supervisor’s competence 
amounted to “an act of insubordination.”129 The Court under-
scored the importance of maintaining hierarchical office rela-
tionships.130 The Court then applied the balancing test from 
Pickering, weighing the importance of maintaining that hierar-
chical authority against the minimal relationship that the em-
ployee’s speech had to any matter of public concern.131 It is thus 
apparent that the professional military environment is but a 
subset of a broader set of civilian professions wherein hierarchy 
is an important interest.132 And military sociologists have noted 
 
 128. Compare Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983) (noting that gov-
ernment’s disciplinary action was motivated in part by employee questioning 
competence of supervisor), with United States v. Gustafson, 5 C.M.R. 360, 361 
(1952) (noting that government’s disciplinary action was provoked by subordi-
nate stating “Captain, you’re no damned good”). 
 129. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151. 
 130. Id. at 153. 
 131. Id. at 154. 
 132. Martin L. Cook, Army Professionalism: Service to What Ends?, in THE 
FUTURE OF THE ARMY PROFESSION 337, 348–49 (Lloyd J. Matthews ed., 2002) 
(“The relation between senior attending physicians in teaching hospitals and 
their interns is every bit as hierarchical as the military; senior partners of ma-
jor law firms are without doubt as superior to their junior associates as senior 
military officers are to their subordinates.”). 
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that the military has not escaped broader societal trends that 
require leaders to take into account growing individualism and 
differences of opinions.133 Thus, the kinds of concerns and fac-
tors that structure authority in the military and civilian work-
places are similar and, presumably, amenable to a balancing 
approach like that in Pickering.  
III.  CONGRESS OR THE COURTS SHOULD ADAPT THE 
PICKERING BALANCING TEST TO GOVERN MILITARY AS 
WELL AS CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES’ SPEECH   
The growing erosion of the foundations for judicial defer-
ence towards military limitations on members’ free speech 
rights opens a window for reform, but does not in itself indicate 
which reforms should be enacted. This Part notes two existing 
proposals intended to increase military members’ free speech 
rights. The “discretionary” approach suggests that existing le-
gal frameworks be retained, but that military commanders be 
encouraged to apply Pickering analysis on their own. At the 
other extreme, the “pure Pickering” approach suggests that 
rules applied to civilian employees derived from the Pickering 
line of cases be applied to military employees without any mod-
ification. This Part will critique each of these solutions, arguing 
instead for a “modified Pickering” approach that does away 
with the courts’ traditional presumption of a military that is 
separate from and outside the law, while still accommodating 
specific functional military requirements. This Part also argues 
that the ideal method for implementing this reform is through 
modification of the Manual for Courts-Martial. However, re-
form could be applied through the courts as well.  
A. DISCRETIONARY IMPLEMENTATION OF PICKERING STANDARDS 
WOULD PROVIDE INADEQUATE PROTECTIONS 
One option for reform suggests that Pickering standards be 
applied to the military context informally, using the discretion 
of military commanders rather than the authority of the 
courts.134 Specifically, those promoting discretionary Pickering 
standards argue that formal application of Pickering would 
burden military operations by threatening readiness and unit 
 
 133. See, e.g., Anna Simons, Backbone vs. Box: The Choice Between Princi-
pled and Prescriptive Leadership, in THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY PROFESSION, 
supra note 132, at 379, 385–87. 
 134. Carr, supra note 7, at 367. 
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cohesion during deployments, even during peacetime.135 These 
conjectures do not, however, include any specific scenarios as to 
how Pickering standards would cause these ill effects. Indeed, 
they merely highlight the social dynamics within military units 
that serve to dissuade most dissenters even in the absence of 
criminal sanctions contained in the general articles.136 Since 
military customs, military culture, and the overall political de-
mographics of military members would remain the same after 
application of Pickering standards to free speech, it is difficult 
to see where major new threats to readiness and cohesion 
would come from even if a few dissenters were allowed to speak 
out without punishment. 
Those preferring discretionary application of Pickering 
standards also argue that judicial application would involve an 
“intrusive and disruptive inquiry into the personnel decisions of 
the military.”137 Specifically, they contend that applying Picker-
ing would place civilian courts in a position of reviewing not on-
ly criminal convictions under the general articles, but also re-
viewing “administrative discharges and re-assignments.”138 
Because of the chilling effect of the military’s process for 
nonjudicial punishments, this concern is not completely with-
out merit.139 But there seems no reason to embrace the tacit be-
lief that military courts would not be able to interpret and ap-
ply the Pickering standards in the same way that they apply 
the existing standards from Parker.140 Moreover, there seems no 
basis for the assumption that administrative actions, like 
transfers, would be included in civilian judicial oversight any 
more than such actions have been included in the civilian con-
text.141 And civilian courts in the process of scrutinizing mili-
tary policies have already restricted their review of military 
personnel decisions to situations where the case has advanced 
to the point of discharge.142 It is reasonable to assume that the 
 
 135. Id. at 365. 
 136. Id. at 361. 
 137. Id. at 365. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 140. See United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 447 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (apply-
ing a “balancing test” to an Article 134 case). 
 141. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (acknowledging “the 
common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every 
employment decision became a constitutional matter”). 
 142. See Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that completed discharge or “long-term suspension” linked to a dis-
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same scope of limitations would apply to civilian judicial re-
views based on Pickering standards. 
Moreover, predicating Pickering protections on the discre-
tion of military commanders would seem to present an inherent 
conflict of interest. After all, the Court has noted that mere dis-
like for the speech on the part of the workplace supervisor 
should not be sufficient grounds for punishment.143 Rendering 
the protections of Pickering merely a component of command-
ers’ discretion would strip away any meaningful check on such 
arbitrariness.144 Most importantly, it is the courts—not work-
place supervisors or military commanders—that are tasked 
with determining the proper scope of constitutional rights.145 
B. PURE PICKERING BALANCING WOULD NEGLECT LEGITIMATE 
MILITARY NEEDS 
At the opposite extreme from the discretionary approach 
lies the option of applying Pickering balancing to regulate mili-
tary members’ speech without modification in order to further 
accelerate the decline of judicial deference towards the mili-
tary.146 Indeed, some argue that the courts’ traditional defer-
ence to the military is not merely conceptually wrong, but ac-
tively dangerous.147 Deference, according to this view, has 
allowed the military to “manipulate” the Supreme Court into 
protecting the military from mere embarrassment148 and con-
ceal mistreatment of detainees since 9/11.149 Thus, some view 
the application of Pickering balancing as a key opportunity to 
scale back deference, and thus is justified even apart from the 
First Amendment implications.150  
 
charge recommendation was required to give a military member standing to 
challenge the military’s action on constitutional grounds). 
 143. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) (“Vigilance is nec-
essary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over employees to 
silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions but simply because 
superiors disagree with the content of employees’ speech.”). 
 144. See Sugin, supra note 8, at 889 n.253. 
 145. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 370 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 146. Rosen, supra note 8, at 898–908. 
 147. Id. at 906–08. 
 148. Id. at 906 (citing as an example United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 
(1953)). 
 149. Id. at 907. 
 150. See id. at 899 (“[D]eference to the military has backfired in the past. 
The military must be held accountable to ensure that it does not abuse its 
power.”). 
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Such a ham-handed rejection of all deference, however, 
sweeps too broadly. The military does, in fact, have unique re-
quirements that require accommodation by the courts, includ-
ing in the area of free speech. For example, while it may be cor-
rect that “[p]olitical dissent by off-duty, non-uniformed 
[military members] does not have the potential to derail the 
military from its objectives,”151 this view fails to notice the dif-
ferent civilian and military meanings of “off-duty.” For exam-
ple, when military members are stationed on bases in the Unit-
ed States where they return to civilian homes at the end of 
each duty day, the conflation of civilian and military jobs may 
be appropriate.152 But when military members are deployed 
overseas, and in particular in combat operations, they are, in 
effect, in the “workplace” twenty-four hours a day, seven days a 
week. This requires courts to treat differently military mem-
bers’ speech by inquiring into the specific location, time, and 
conditions surrounding it, acting to protect military members’ 
speech more aggressively in the United States, but declining to 
act when the context of the speech is one that requires defer-
ence to uniquely military concerns due to overseas operational 
deployments.153 But selective deference is still a form of defer-
ence that a purist rejection of judicial deference towards the 
military would seem to disallow.154 
Because it is a combat organization, at times requiring in-
tense discipline and camaraderie, the military also has some 
unique requirements regarding the substance of speech. While 
it is quite correct to note that expressions of dissent do not ne-
cessitate failures of discipline,155 there are at least two areas 
where particular types of speech, that a pure application of the 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1331–32 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 
(upholding restrictions against circulation of anti-war petitions on a military 
base in Vietnam as a time, place, or manner restriction on otherwise protected 
speech); A FEW GOOD MEN (Columbia Pictures 1992) (“It’s because it was what 
they were ordered to do. Now, out in the real world, that means nothing. And 
here at the Washington Navy Yard, it doesn’t mean a whole lot more. But if 
you’re a marine assigned to Rifle Security Company Windward, Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, and you’re given an order, you follow it or you pack your bags.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 8, at 905–06 (“National security interests 
do not justify an abuse of the public trust, which has previously occurred when 
the Supreme Court has taken too deferential a stance on military regulations. 
The Supreme Court should hold the military to a higher standard, and one 
way to achieve this is to apply the public employee doctrine.”).  
 155. Id. at 905 (“[C]riticism does not automatically lead to insubordination.”). 
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Pickering balancing would allow, might damage military disci-
pline. First, the broad application of Pickering balancing would 
prohibit the government from punishing employees solely be-
cause of their “political affiliation.”156 In fact, some assert that 
“[t]he military has never indicated that political affiliation is a 
prerequisite for serving in the armed forces.”157 But the military 
penalizes members for participation in designated hate 
groups.158 Such a ban on membership hate groups may be 
uniquely justified by the camaraderie necessary for effective 
combat units. Moreover, the case of Major Nidal Hasan shows 
the need for the military to be sensitive to the adoption by mili-
tary members of political attitudes that sympathize with a cur-
rent enemy.159 A pure application of the Pickering public em-
ployee doctrine is blind to these considerations which are 
legitimately unique to the functional requirements of the mili-
tary, even without embracing the “separate community”  
rationale. 
Second, a pure application of Pickering balancing to the 
military is blind to the special military status of the President 
as Commander-in-Chief. In fact, some would apply Pickering 
not only to eliminate military restrictions under the general ar-
ticles of the UCMJ, but also to eliminate military restrictions 
barring “contemptuous words” towards the President.160 Indeed, 
some argue that not punishing even endorsements of assassi-
 
 156. Id. at 893 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 375 (1976)). 
 157. Id. at 905. Note that Rosen does not provide any support for this  
assertion. 
 158. See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, INSTRUCTION 51-903, ¶ 5.2 (1998), 
available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI51-903.pdf 
(“Commanders are authorized to use the full range of administrative proce-
dures, including separation or appropriate disciplinary action against military 
personnel who actively participate in [hate] groups.”); see also Kevin Baron, 
DoD Tightens Hate Group Restrictions, MILITARY.COM (Apr. 15, 2010), 
http://www.military.com/news/article/dod-tightens-hate-group-restrictions.html 
(reporting on a recent updated Department of Defense directive increasing re-
strictions on hate group participation for all the armed services). 
 159. See Jim Miklaszewski, 9 Officers Face Disciplinary Action in Fort 
Hood Shooting, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
42017230/ns/us_news-security/ (reporting punishment of officers supervising the 
Fort Hood shooter for failure to react to signs of his increasing radicalization). 
 160. Compare UCMJ art. 88, 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006) (prohibiting “contemp-
tuous words” toward the President from officers), with Rosen, supra note 8, at 
900–01 (criticizing the contrast between Rankin v. McPherson, where the 
Court held that a civilian expression of support for presidential assassination 
was protected speech, and United States v. Ogren, where a military court 
found that a Naval officer’s expression of support for presidential assassina-
tion was not protected). 
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nation by military members would lead to “more just results” 
than the current Article 88 prohibitions.161 But while it may be 
true that Article 88 restrictions originate in “seventeenth cen-
tury British anti-treason laws,”162 the critique exaggerates the 
scope of the prohibitions163 and ignores their underlying modern 
rationale. In fact, the modern rationale for Article 88 lies in an 
apparently legitimate military need to maintain discipline 
within a chain of command that places the President at the 
top.164 Article 88 also covers only the President, Vice President, 
Congress, Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, military 
departments, and the governors of the states.165 Article 88 thus 
in itself leaves open all other officials and all substantive poli-
cies for dissent. Moreover, the military has enforced Article 88 
sparingly, mostly focusing narrowly on cases that do not in-
volve substantive dissent based in policy.166 
C. FREE SPEECH PROTECTION DURING PEACETIME AND 
DEFERENCE DURING WARTIME WOULD BOTH PROTECT TOO 
MUCH AND TOO LITTLE 
Not all scholars have taken such an all-or-nothing ap-
proach to reform. For example, some suggest that the free 
speech protections of Pickering could be applied to military 
members during peacetime, but the courts could defer to the 
 
 161. Rosen, supra note 8, at 900. 
 162. Id. at 880. 
 163. See id. at 880–81 (claiming without support that Article 88 prohibits 
not only “contemptuous words” towards senior officials, but also “leaves soldiers 
unable to voice their criticism of a war in which they are forced to participate”). 
 164. Michael J. Davidson, Contemptuous Speech Against the President, 
1999 ARMY LAW. 1, 12 (“The President is more than just another politician. He 
is the Commander-in-Chief, and as such, is entitled to no less protection under 
the UCMJ than the most junior officer or noncommissioned officer who suffers 
disrespect at the hands of an insubordinate private.”). 
 165. See UCMJ art. 88, 10 U.S.C. § 888. 
 166. See, e.g., Ezra Klein, How to Punish McChrystal?, WASH. POST (June 
23, 2010, 9:26 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/06/how_ 
to_punish_mcchrystal.html (speculating on the potential use of Article 88 to 
punish Gen. Stanley McChrystal for pejorative comments directed towards 
Vice President Biden and reported in Rolling Stone magazine). It is fairly cer-
tain that General McChrystal, the Afghanistan commander at the time, was 
not expressing dissent towards the substantive policy of pursuing military ac-
tion in Afghanistan, but rather merely making personal attacks on admin-
istration officials. See Julian E. Barnes & Peter Nicholas, General’s Fate in the 
Balance, CHI. TRIB., June 23, 2010, at 13. For an overview of the extent and lim-
its of the military’s policy on “contemptuous words,” see generally Davidson, su-
pra note 164. 
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military during wartime.167 Such a compromise could produce 
the worst of both worlds, protecting both too much and too lit-
tle. Too much protection could derive from the fact that most 
modern military operations—including combat deployments—
take place in the absence of a declaration of war or even a for-
mal authorization for use of force.168 That means that even dur-
ing times and at places in which the military’s need for disci-
pline and camaraderie are at their peak, the “wartime only” 
proposal would be as blind to them as a pure approach.  
In other contexts, the wartime-only proposal could be too 
weak. In the event that there is a declaration of war or authori-
zation for use of force that created “wartime,” those military 
members who are far removed from the combat zone and work-
ing in jobs similar to civilians would be unnecessarily stripped 
of their free speech protections at a time when dissent may be 
vitally important to ongoing political debates about military ac-
tion. Moreover, the military’s use of wartime exigencies as a 
blanket justification to demand deference has a dark history in 
the Korematsu case,169 and it would serve us well to be cautious 
about reenacting a standard that might allow the military to 
use the existence of a national emergency to broadly suppress 
dissent. 
D. PICKERING STANDARDS CAN BE ADAPTED TO UNIQUELY 
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 
As the foregoing Sections have shown, the optimal balance 
for reform of military members’ free speech rights cannot be 
found either in purist all-or-nothing approaches or in the black-
and-white delineation of wartime from peacetime. Rights of 
dissent in the military demand a more nuanced approach that 
is sensitive to the unique mixture of combat from noncombat 
contexts that exist every day in the modern American military. 
Although the military as a whole increasingly resembles a 
civilian profession, military life during overseas deployment 
 
 167. Sugin, supra note 8, at 857. 
 168. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Obama’s Unconstitutional War, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/24/obama_ 
s_unconstitutional_war ( lamenting the ease with which President Obama or-
dered military action in Libya without any authorization by Congress). 
 169. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. See generally Dawinder S. 
Sidhu, First Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the 
Wartime Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims of Discrimination, 58 BUFF. L. 
REV. 419, 494–500 (2010) (tracing the recurring theme of abuses when the 
Supreme Court allows “wartime” to trump civil liberties concerns). 
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more closely resembles the “separate community” traditionally 
viewed by the courts.170 The Pickering Court’s distinction be-
tween workplace and non-workplace speech does not contem-
plate the 24/7 workplace that is a defining feature of deployed 
combat operations.171 Traditional concerns about the effect of 
dissent on morale and discipline are most intense in a combat 
environment and, when limited to that environment, constitute 
less of an infringement on First Amendment liberties than a 
general prohibition.172 Thus, for military members deployed in 
combat or peacekeeping, the definition of “workplace” should be 
expanded to encompass the entire duration of their deploy-
ment. As the Court noted in Garcetti v. Ceballos, speech that 
takes place pursuant to actual performance of an employees’ 
duties can be regulated much more heavily than speech outside 
the workplace.173 While a military member stationed “in garri-
son” in the United States returns home from work each day 
and essentially transforms into a civilian while off-duty, a mili-
tary member deployed overseas is always at some level a repre-
sentative of the United States government to the people in the 
country where he or she is stationed. Thus, Garcetti offers addi-
tional justification for this particular adjustment of the Picker-
ing approach to a military context.174 
Military regulations prohibiting active membership in hate 
groups could also be retained under a modified Pickering ap-
proach. Acknowledging the unique military need for discipline 
and camaraderie, the military’s prohibition on hate groups 
should be cast as a uniquely military version of the Connick 
 
 170. See Sugin, supra note 8, at 878–80 (proposing that judicial protections 
for military members’ free speech be foregone in wartime under the political 
question doctrine). Sugin relies, however, on the assumption that wartime will 
involve a draft that serves to enhance the political representation of military 
members’ interests. See id. at 880. 
 171. Cf. Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1331–32 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 
(upholding restrictions against circulation of anti-war petitions on a military 
base in Vietnam as a time, place, or manner restriction on otherwise protected 
speech). 
 172. Id. at 1333; see also A FEW GOOD MEN, supra note 153 (“It’s because it 
was what they were ordered to do. Now, out in the real world, that means 
nothing. And here at the Washington Navy Yard, it doesn’t mean a whole lot 
more. But if you’re a marine assigned to Rifle Security Company Windward, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and you’re given an order, you follow it or you pack 
your bags.”). 
 173. 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). 
 174. See id. 
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concern about preventing speech that interferes with the mis-
sion of the workplace.175 
The Pickering approach should also be adapted to retain 
the Article 88 prohibitions on personal attacks directed against 
the President and other senior government officials. This 
should be done by interpreting the “public concern” test nar-
rowly, allowing military members to speak freely in dissent 
with regards to the substance of policy while limiting the ap-
propriate manner of that expression to preclude ad hominem 
attacks. Thus, it may be best to retain Article 88 prohibitions 
as exceptions to the Pickering balancing process while limiting 
the reach of those protections to those areas most essential to 
military discipline. 
While still incorporating limits narrowly tailored to specific 
military concerns, this adaptation of the Pickering balancing 
approach towards workers’ dissenting speech would still repre-
sent a dramatic expansion of the free speech rights of military 
members. As former Chief Justice Earl Warren noted in his in-
fluential description of the application of the Bill of Rights to 
military members, “situations in which the judiciary refrains 
from examining the merit of the claim of [military] necessity 
must be kept to an absolute minimum.”176 But the adaptations 
proposed here would apply the Pickering standards to a mili-
tary context, protecting dissent on matters of public concern 
while at the same time weighing the government’s interest in 
effective military operations.177 Moreover, such a weighing 
would not prevent the government from addressing serious 
threats to military discipline, but would require the govern-
ment to show actual, rather than merely speculative, threats to 
discipline before proscribing dissent.178 But importantly, these 
adaptations would serve to balance military and members’ in-
terests without regard to formalistic wartime/peacetime  
distinctions. 
E. THE ADAPTED PICKERING STANDARDS COULD BE ENACTED 
THROUGH THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL OR INDEPENDENT 
JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT 
The most direct route for implementing reform would be 
through the President. Because the goal of maintaining “good 
 
 175. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 153 (1983). 
 176. Warren, supra note 51, at 193. 
 177. See Sugin, supra note 8, at 884. 
 178. Id. at 888–89; see also id. at 888 n.247. 
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order and discipline” would be maintained as a legitimate gov-
ernment interest under the adapted Pickering rules,179 it would 
not be necessary to amend the UCMJ itself. Rather, the Presi-
dent could insert the adapted Pickering rules into the relevant 
sections of the MCM, requiring the prosecution to show that 
“disloyal statements” took place within a workplace as defined 
above and either did not regard a matter of public concern or 
had an actual deleterious effect on the functioning of the unit’s 
mission.180 
Even if the President fails to act, however, the courts could 
apply Pickering standards to the military independently. After 
all, as the Supreme Court has noted, military members do not 
forfeit their constitutional rights upon joining the military.181 
The “different application” of those rights was a creation of the 
Court in Parker.182 The Court is therefore surely competent to 
disabuse itself of its own doctrinal creation.  
  CONCLUSION   
Although courts have traditionally drawn a sharp separa-
tion between the speech rights of government civilian employ-
ees and those of the military, this distinction has rested on er-
roneous assumptions regarding the separation between 
military and civilian communities and the role of dissent within 
military organizations. Recently, however, civilian courts have 
begun to question the deference traditionally accorded to the 
military, particularly with regard to service members’ civil lib-
erties. This presents an opportunity for the President or the 
courts to promulgate a more contemporary standard for regu-
lating speech in the military workplace. This new standard 
need not be invented from whole cloth, however, as the balanc-
ing test developed in Pickering and Connick offers a sufficient 
basis for adapting a new doctrine for dealing with military dis-
sent—a dissent without disloyalty. 
 
 179. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 180. See UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2006) (empowering the Presi-
dent to issue regulations implementing the UCMJ “including modes of proof [ ] 
for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial”); see also Levy v. 
Dillon 286 F. Supp. 593, 596 (D. Kan. 1968), aff ’d, 415 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 
1969) (holding that the MCM has the force of statutory law). 
 181. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (“[M]embers of the 
military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amend-
ment . . . .”). 
 182. See id. 
